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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
deliberately designed to stimulate sex feelings and to act as an aphrodisiac whereas
an obscene book has no such immediate and dominant purpose, although incidentally this may be its effect.60 This will not be considered since it is the purpose
of this writing to show that the present censorship statutes are unconstitutional.
It will have to remain to be determined whether a narrowly-drawn statute can
meet the "clear and probable danger" test.
June A. Murray
TEST FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of recovery under workmen's compensation statutes for occupational diseases has been a thorny one since the inception of stautory liability in
this area. Originally recovery was denied in most instances under the theory that
such disablement was not the result of an accident, the latter being a pre-requisite
for liability.1 This result was somewhat tempered by equating diseases incurred as a
consequence of sudden or fortuitous occurrences or of a traumatic event to injuries as a result of accidents. 2 However, even with this, a vast number of diseases
incidental to employment were left uncovered for it is settled that there can be
no recovery for disablement as a result of an occupational disease unless the workmen's compensation law specifically so authorizes.3
With the passage of time, the various states enacted specific legislation in this
area4 until at the present time all but three states provide at least minimal
coverage.5 These statutes may be divided roughly into two categories: 0 those which
60.

See JACKSON, THE FEAiz OF BOOKS

121-135

(1932);

ST. JOHN-STEVAS,

OBSCENITY AND THE LAv 2 (1956). United States v. Ulysses, supra, note 59. It Is

this writer's view that if section 22(a) were drafted so as to describe only
"pornographic" matter (as was involved, concededly, in Brown v. Kingsley Books,
1 N. Y. 2d 177, 134 N. E. 2d 461 (1956)) the statute would be constitutional. See 6
BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 156, n.5, 157 (1957). This determination involves another
fact question-What is pornographic and what is not? However this will bring
an end to the prosecution of books which can be said to have any literary merit
or which were written for any legitimate purpose. It would also appear that
under such a statute, the intent of the author may take on added importance
although the subjective element could be handled, as it is at the present time,
by determining his intent as it may be gleaned from the book, Itself.
1. State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
2. Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Kerr, 203 Ky. 804, 263 S.W. 342 (1924); Renlkel
v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834 (1923).
3. Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760 (1950);
State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
4.

E.g., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 3 (2).

5. Kansas, Mississippi and Wyoming do not provide for occupational disease
coverage.
6. Most of the statutes have other differences within the two major categories. See, e.g., COLORADO STAT. ANN. c. 97, §451 (c), (e) wherein special requirements for recovery for silicosis are provided.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
allow recovery for specific diseases7 and those which allow recovery for occupational diseases in general8 or in addition to specifically named diseases.9 In those
states which restrict recovery to certain diseases (as well as in those states which
have no provisions for occupational disease coverage) the test of "a sudden or
fortuitous event" remains applicable to those diseases not covered.' 0 In the remaining states the general test has become: Was the disease a natural incident of the
particular employment?' While seemingly simple in its terms, the test has
received far from consistent application. This article will attempt to present the
accepted view as culled from a myriad of judicial opinions and statutory constructions.
1I. THEORY OF RECOVERY
Workmen's compensation statutes allow recovery for injuries arising out of
and in the course of the employment.' 2 These qualifications have been interpreted
to mean, not that the injury be caused by the nature of the employment but rather
'that the injury be caused by the fact that the employee was employed.' 3 Liberality
of application has further reduced this in effect to the point where recovery may
be had merely because the injury occurred while the employee was "on the job."' 4
While there are many conflicting decisions, the distinction between "risks of the
job" and "risks of everyday life" is seldom made except in those instances where
recovery has been traditionally denied.15
In the area of occupational disease, however, liberality has been slower to
arrive. It has never been denied that the industry must be an actual cause of the
disease and not merely the situs-the distinction between "risks of the job" and
"risks of everyday life" haa been preserved. Thus, a person who becomes afflicted
with an infectious disease by reason of drinking from a public fountain while at
work would probably not recover under a theory of occupational disease; 16 on the
7. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1204.
8. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-3.
9. See, e.g., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION4 LA.v §3 (2).
10. State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
11. Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938); Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N. Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785 (1948); LeLenko
v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942); Carter v. International
Detrola Corp., 328 Mich. 367, 43 N.W.2d 890 (1950).
12. See, e.g., N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §10.
13. For an extreme example, see Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 37 Cal. App. 2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1940).
, 297 P.2d 649
14. Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Commisio,---Cal. 2d(1956).
15. Compare Mack v. Reo Motors, - Mich. -, 76 N.W.2d 35 (1956) with
Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Commission, - Cal. 2d -, 297 P.2d 649 (1956);
see Notes, 6 BUFFALO L. REv. (1957), infra., this issue.
16. Maddeo v. I. Dibner & Bros, Inc., 121 Conn. 664, 18 A.2d 616 (1936)
(tuberculosis resulting from crowded, unsanitary conditions); Mills v. Columbia
Gas Const. Co., 246 Ky. 464, 55 S.W.2d 394 (1932) (contaminated drinking water).
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other hand, had he injured himself at the same fountain, he would doubtlessly
receive compensation. t A compensable injury is not dependent upon special
hazards of the employment whereas an occupational disease must have been
caused by conditions which are not present in industry in general but which are
peculiar to the industry or type thereof in which the disease was incurred.
The courts are generally in accord as to the above distinction although a few
states, because of their liberal statutes, have virtually abolished the requirement for
peculiarity of hazard in the field of occupational disease.' 8 An area of dispute has
arisen, however, as to whether the industry must be the sole cause of the disease
(that is, whether the disease must be of the nature which the normal person might
incur solely as a result of being employed under such conditions). The problem of
the employee who is predisposed or susceptible to the particular disease in question
has produced a multitude of seemingly conflicting decisions.
III. THE CONFLICT
The conflict noted above is perhaps best illustrated through the medium of
example:
1. X Company is a printing establishment. During the course of its operations certain fumes are emitted. While there has been no history of
dermatitis in the plant, A, who is allergic to such fumes, contracts the
disease. Recovery will probably be allowed. 10
2. B has a congenital back defect. As a result of his day to day employment
activities his defect is aggravated. He can point to no specific injury nor
can he show that his fellow workers have been similarly afflicted. Recov20
ery will probably be denied.
While there seems to be good reason why B should not recover since his own
physical disposition has caused the affliction, such rationale should apply equally
to A. It is the writer's opinion that this "conflict" is a result, not of disagreement
between or within jurisdictions, but rather of differences in the fact situations of
the cases in question. There are two distinctions to be noted in the above
examples. In Example 1 A was employed by an industry which had a hazard
peculiar to it, whereas in Example 2, B was performing tasks which are common
to industry as a whole. Further, B was afflicted with an actual defect whereas A's
predisposition was merely a susceptibility. Thus A, despite his allergy, might be
considered "normal" and B, because of his physical defect, might be considered
17. Alabama Concrete Pipe Co. v. Berry, 266 Ala. 204, 146 So. 271 (1933);
Widell Co. v. Industrial Commission, 180 Wis. 179, 192 N.W. 449 (1923).
18. E.g., Wis. STAT. c. 102.01 (2).
19. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942).
20. Detenbeck v. General Motors Corp., 309 N.Y. 558, 132 N.E.2d 840 (1956).
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"abnormal." This distinction was the basis of an award for contraction of epicondylitis (tennis-elbow) where it was shown that the employee's predisposition
consisted of a susceptibility rather than an actual pre-existing defect.2 1 Behind such
awards is probably the thought that, lacking a pre-existing defect, it is impossible
to say that the "normal" person would not contract such a disease or that a person
who contracts such a disease is not "normal."
The result of such decisions is not to preclude recovery to the person who
suffers from a congenital defect, but to force him to demonstrate that, while he
may have been more susceptible to the disease in question, the nature of the
hazard was such that the normal person could have contracted it.2 2 The decisions
in this area reflect an attempt to place the "abnormal" person on equal footing
with the so-called "normal" person. Thus, even a person with a congenital defect
may recover for an occupational disease if he can show that the particular hazard
which was a cause of his affliction is peculiar to the industry involved and further,
23
that it was not only a hazard as to him but to the "normal" person as well.
IV. THE NEw Yom VIEw
New Yoik has followed the general theory as presented in this comment
although in specific instances has set down a somewhat rigid test. In Detenbeck v.
General Motors Corp.24 recovery was denied to an applicant whose "disease" was
traced to a congenital back defect. The Court of Appeals seemingly set forth a
rule denying recovery in any instance where it could not be shown that the
"normal" person would be similarly afflicted. However, it may be noted that in
Detenbeck, the activity causing the disease was not peculiar to the industry and
that the employee's defect was more than mere susceptibility. 25 While the definition
of occupational disease set forth in Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp.26 is somewhat
restrictive it may be noted that New York has subsequently allowed recovery in
28
allergy cases27 and in other areas where there was a pre-existing susceptibility.
21. Samuels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317 Mich. 149, 26 N.W.2d 742
(1947).
22. Pinto v. Competent Fur Dressers, 297 N. Y. 846, 78 N.E.2d 864 (1948).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. 309 N.Y. 558, 132 N.E.2d 840 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 75 (1956).
25. Employee was afflicted with a congenital back deformity which was
aggravated by his daily duties which consisted of inspecting and lifting boxes.
26. An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the
employment, and by nature is meant . . . conditions to which all employees..
are subject, and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular
occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from
the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending employment in general ...

."

276 N. Y. 313, 318, 319, 12 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1938).

27. Horvath v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 275 App. Div. 1014, 91 N.Y.S.
2d 709 (3d Dep't 1949).
28. Buchanan v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 278 App. Div. 594, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1011
(3d Dep't 1951), afj'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 848, 100 N.E.2d 45 (1951).
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V. CONCLUSION
It is the writer's opinion that the Detenbeck and Goldberg decisions present
the correct view of the law. A person who is pre-disposed to injury or disease
should not be allowed to recover in instances where there is no particular hazard
connected with the employment. If there has been a trend in this direction it is
fortunate that the Detenbeck case has made the rule clear in New York. It is felt
that these decisions will not preclude recovery where it has been previously had
but that they merely put a limit upon the liability of the employer. An employee
will be permitted to recover despite his pre-existing susceptibility provided he can
show that the hazard which caused his "disease" is one peculiar to the industry in
which he works and provided that it is not convincingly shown that such hazard
would not in any event cause a similar affliction in the normal employee.
Vincent P. Furlong

INSURANCE COVERAGE AND INTER-SPOUSE LIABILITY
In 1937 the legislature amended Section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law 1
and removed the common law disability of suits between spouses. This legislation
followed soon after decisions by the Court of Appeals which applied the common
law rule of nonliability in an action by a wife against a partnership based on
injuries caused by the act of her husband who was a partner 2 and to an interspouse suit between New York residents upon a foreign cause of action which
was sued upon in New York.3
At the same time as Section 57 was enacted the former version of what is
now Section 167(3) 4 of the Insurance Law was passed. The Section 5 provides, in
effect, that no liability policy shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an
1. N. Y. DOMEsTIc RELATIONS LAw §57 . . .A married woman has a right
of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her In
any personal injury... as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortious acts ... as if they were unmarried.
2. Caplan v. Caplan,268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935).
3. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. 2d 597 (1936).
4. N. Y. ISUPANCE LAw §167(3). No policy or contract shall be deemed to
insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or Injuries to his
or her spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her
spouse unless express provision relating specifically therto is included In the
policy. Except for the words "of death" which were inserted in 1941 this provision is identical with the former Section 109 (3a) of the Insurance Law. See
N. Y. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 669 §2. The 1941 amendment was the result of the decision in Gen. Ace. Fire And Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp. 190 (W. D.
N. Y. 1940) which held that the section did not apply to a wronful death action
between spouses.
5. Hereinafter the writer shall refer to 167 (3) as the Section.

